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STATUS OF NATURAL LAW IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE *
The noted French philosopher, Etienne Gilson, has said
truly: "The natural law always buries its undertakers." 1
It now seems that we are witnessing the obsequies of the
Natural-Law morticians of our day. And our feelings are
expressed by the words of the United States senator who
was asked if he expected to attend the last rites for a na-
tional character of his day: "No," he said, "I am not going
to the funeral, but I approve of it."
The French philosopher's observation was based upon the
fact that history reveals man's necessity to return to Nat-
ural Law concepts whenever they have been abandoned.
Man is forced again and again to return to the "Natural
Law way of thinking" because it is an expression of his
moral nature. There are principles applicable to man's moral
nature which are referred to as laws just as there are prin-
ciples referred to as laws of his physical nature. The main
thesis of this discussion is that we are now in one of those
periods when the circumstances of life again force men to
accept the principles of Natural Moral Law.
Any lawyer whose professional career began during the
first ten years of the present century and who is still alive
and able to note the trends of current thought, has wit-
nessed two great changes in the philosophy of jurisprudence.
When he came to the bar, Coke, Blackstone, Kent, Story,
Minor, and Cooley were still respected sources of legal
learning, and the Natural Law philosophy of the Founding
Fathers was unquestioned. But during the ensuing thirty
years there was a great shift from those authorities and
* Originally delivered as an address at the Second Annual Natural
Law Institute, College of Law, University of Notre Dame, Decem-
ber 11, 1948.
1 HEmrCu A. RottE, THE NATuRAL LAW 242 (1948).
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that philosophy to what has come to be known as modern
positivism or realism. And now within the last eight or ten
years there are unmistakable signs of dissatisfaction over
the insufficiency, the aridity, of modern positivism, and
very definite indications of a revival of Natural Law
philosophy.
It is of course impossible to set exact dates or clearly
define the boundaries of trends in thought or philosophy.
Changes come about gradually, they are never complete.
There is always the remnant, the modicum, who adhere to
the former course in spite of popular deflections. The boun-
daries of eras and trends are not clear cut; they feather
out. But the general effects of the great trends are never-
theless quite apparent.
Positivism
It is unnecessary to trace in detail the extent or effect of
positivism during the early decades of this century. That
has been well done by Dean Pound, Mr. Ben Palmer, Mr.
Harold McKinnon, Mr. C. P. Ives, and others. As Mr.
McKinnon says:
This teaching nullifies the Declaration of Independence, the
preamble of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. It nulli-
fies twenty-five hundred years of progress in political and
legal theory and re-enacts in the present age some of the
worst political and legal errors of ancient times. It is indis-
tinguishable, in its origin and its logical effect, from philoso-
phies which characterized lands against which we have just
fought the bloodiest war in history.2
At Home
In this country positivism tended to discredit the judicial
function and over-emphasize the importance of administra-
tive procedure. The fiat rule of administrative boards was
2 Harold R. McKinnon, The Higher Law, an address delivered before the
conference of Federal Judges of the Ninth Circuit at San Francisco, Sept. 3, 1946.
Published by the Gillik Press, Berkely, Calif., 1946. 33 A.BA.J. 966 (1947).
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substituted quite extensively for legal procedure of courts.3
Precedent was disregarded, balance of powers was scoffed
at, and the Constitution was openly flouted.
This all came about in a very subtle and indirect way.
There was no open or frontal attack, and the overwhelming
majority of the legal profession never knew that there was
a movement against the basic principles of our jurispru-
dence until they discovered that all their arguments based
on inalienable rights, Natural Law, or the Constitution,
were being laughed at by public administrators. The cham-
pions of modem Positivism, the self-styled Realists, pro-
ceeded mainly by innuendo and cynicism. Inspired by the
pragmatism of Professor John Dewey and the skepticism
of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, they arrogated a disdain
for Natural Law and discredited all claims of natural right.
It then gradually became their habit to assume, as some
said, that "most of the best thinkers on politics (meaning
themselves) of the present day will agree that there is no
such thing as a natural right", and that "modern scholars
(again themselves) have totally abandoned natural law."
One student was told in open class by his law professor
that he should never again mention Natural Law, that its
concepts were unattainable, antiquated, discredited, and
dead as the dodo.
All the younger officers of the Ship of State during the
1930's and early 1940's were men who had been subjected
to this modern sophistry during the impressionable years of
their education. The older men, it seems, were intimidated
by the oncoming intelligentsia; they were afraid to defend
the Natural-Law concepts of right and truth and justice
lest they be thought puritans, prudes, or old-fashioned. This
attitude of skepticism, cynicism, and negation toward the
moral and ideal concepts of Natural Law philosophy found
8 JosEPH C. HuTcH-sox, NEw INsTummrs or PuB c PowFR (California
Bar Association, 1946).
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a very congenial climate of opinion in the intense scientism,
materialism, and secularism which followed World War I.
The critical problems of our national life today have
come directly from this materialistic and positivist attitude
toward life and law. When the ethical and moral content
of our philosophy was abandoned, men felt free to assert
without restraint their novel theories and their personal and
class selfishness, avarice and greed. As a result of the dis-
respect for courts and the judicial process there followed a
corresponding neglect of the common interest and public
welfare. The sole aim in life of most men was profits or
wages, and the affairs of government were abandoned to
policy amateurs or to self-seeking politicians who bartered
and traded for self-aggrandizement and success of party,
bloc, or union. Disputes between the great monopolies of
employers and unions led to strikes which paralyzed the
economic life of the country. Agents of government merely
pampered and pandered instead of enforcing the established
principles of law which for centuries had protected the com-
munity interest. At a time when our national power reached
its maximum strength in the world it seemed to be dis-
integrating at home.
Effect on Judiciary
The clearest evidence of this disintegration was revealed
in the Supreme Court. The number of reversals and dis-
sents exceeded all previous records. The upward sweep of
dissents from the year 1910 to 1946 ranged from thirteen
per cent to sixty-four per cent.' Landmark decisions in con-
stitutional law were overruled with alarn.-'ig celerity. The
constitutional balance of powers was frequently ignored, in
accordance with positivist theory, and the legislative func-
tion was usurped in order to overrule long-established prin-
ciples and promulgate the Court's idea of what the "trend
4 Ben W. Palmer, Dissents and Overruings: A Study of Developments in the
Supreme Court, 34 A.B.AJ. 594 (July 1948).
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and policy" of law should be. The decisions of the Court
were not supported by any uniformity of reasoning even
by the justices who agreed on decisions. There was no
integrating science of law because the fundamental and co-
ordinating principles of our jurisprudence and constitution-
alism had been discredited and abandoned. Decisions and
opinions were improvised according to the predilections of
the various justices. Informed observers seemed to hear
again the critical words of Cicero as he watched the dis-
integration of the Roman Republic:
All confidence was banished from the Forum, not by the
stroke of any new calamity, but by the general suspicion
entertained of the courts of justice, and by the disorder into
which they had fallen, and by the constant reversal of pre-
vious decisions. 5
The chief purpose of the law is to habituate that conduct
which conserves the public good. When therefore the law
loses its certainty and no reliance can be placed in judicial
decisions, the law ceases to perform its function. Further-
more, the characteristic of our jurisprudence, which had
distinguished it from the systems of law in those countries
with which we had gone to war, was its devotion to reason.
When judicial decisions departed from precedent and were
based upon the mere prepossessions of judges, they lost the
distinctive character of Anglo-American jurisprudence and
took on a similitude to the arbitrary or fiat rule of totali-
tarian governments. It was therefore not without reason
that some commentators remarked that what we had fought
for abroad we had lost at home.
Abroad
The effects of this materialistic and positivist attitude
toward life and law were not confined to our country. It
had a world-wide effect. It is now generally recognized that
one of the influences that brought about the revival of the
5 CICERO, DE LEaE AGRARiA, Oratio II, 3, Fin.
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positivist philosophy of law in modern times was the asser-
tion of extreme nationalism which followed the break-up
of the Holy Roman Empire into separate states.6 The arbi-
trary demands of independent states against one another
and the fiat rule of such states within their own boundaries
could not be justified by the principles of Natural Law. As
always, the assertion of arbitrary will was found to be at
variance with the moral and ethical ideals of the Law of
Nature. The classical philosophers, the Roman juriscon-
sults, the Scholastic writers, and the great authorities on
international law, such as Suarez and Grotius, were there-
fore abandoned. The champions of statism adopted those
principles which soon found expression in the teachings and
practices of Machiavelli and later were exemplified in the
Fascism of Mussolini and the Realpolitik of Hitler. Such
theories of government are responsible for the sordid his-
tory of power politics and international anarchy which led
quite naturally to the two world wars and the fateful climax
that now confronts the world.
Effect on Peace
When the victors in World War II assembled at San
Francisco to form some organization for world affairs they
disregarded the proposal of China and several other states
to establish a government upon universal and fundamental
principles of justice and resorted instead to the old hoax
of a tenuous and tentative balance of power among inde-
pendent sovereign nations. The inadequacy of such an
organization became apparent two months later when the
first atom bomb fell on Hiroshima. The insufficiency of
UNO to maintain peace and security in the world has been
demonstrated daily by subsequent international events.
Now of course United Nations Organization is a step in
the right direction and must have our full support in the
6 Rox&=, op. cit. supra note 1, at 128; William Seagle, Mm or LAw 113.
114 (1947); Irving Babbitt, DEMSOCRACY AND LEADERSriP 37, 42, 53 (1939).
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good that it has done and is doing, but it is to be regretted
that it did not establish juridical order at the beginning
instead of a balance of powers.
The war was fought for human rights and human dignity,
but the victors failed to affirm and assert the eternal prin-
ciples upon which such rights and dignity depend. On the
contrary, they adopted and acted upon the false theories of
the nations which they had vanquished. They built the
United Nations upon the impossible and immoral doctrine
of national sovereignty in international affairs and ignored
the universal and eternal principles of Natural Law which
had been expounded and exemplified by the great philo-
sophers and jurists for twenty-five hundred years.
It is one of the great tragedies of human history that
when this nation came to its apex of power and exerted a
force and influence which no other nation had ever pos-
sessed, it deserted the basic philosophy of its Founding
Fathers,7 abandoned the principles upon which its legal
institutions were built, and insisted, not on constitutional-
ism and the rule of law, but on the veto power for the asser-
tion of arbitrary will. In demanding the right of veto it
abandoned the states that represented our ideals of govern-
ment and united with the U.S.S.R., which is the very anti-
thesis of our form of government and our system of juris-
prudence.
The struggle of nations for ascendance has by a process
of elimination now been brought to a final contest between
two great world powers. The juxtaposition of these two
great powers, with the attendant rivalry, suspicion, and fric-
tion, makes a final world struggle inevitable, if they continue
to trust in the might of their own armaments. If the dis-
aster of a third world war is to be averted, the U.S.S.R.
7 Clarence Manion, The Natural Law Philosophy of the Founding Fathers,
Natural Law Institute, University of Notre Dame, 1947; TnE PROCMDINGS OF THE
NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE, Vol. I (1949).
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and the U.S.A. must acknowledge the impossibility of na-
tional sovereignty in international affairs and then unite in
an effort to establish juridical order for the world.
Revival of Natural Law
Thus we see that our most critical problems at home and
abroad stem directly from the materialistic or positivist
philosophy of law and government which had become so
prevalent in the twentieth century. But, as already stated,
when the effects of this modern sophistry began to appear,
there also appeared some definite signs of a counter-move-
ment, a return to Natural Law philosophy. Here again our
limitations forbid a detailed account of the trend. But a
few of the indisputable signs of a renaissance should be
noted.
In 1930 The Harvard University Press published the
doctoral thesis of Charles Grove Haines, entitled, The Re-
vival of Natural Law Concepts.' The expansion of such
revival since the publication of that book is indicated by
the book's growing reputation and the ever-increasing ref-
erences to it. In June 1942 THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
published "The Revival of Natural Law," by Roscoe Pound.
This was a publication of four lectures delivered at the
College of Law, and in the first paragraph Dean Pound said
that in the present century there had been "a revival of
what was called juridical idealism, a revival of philosophical
jurisprudence, and as it soon came to be called, a revival
of natural law."
Dean Pound has been a powerful influence in such revival,
because he, like the jurists of Scotland, Italy, and the Catho-
lic faculties whom he mentions, never followed the deflec-
tions from Natural Law philosophy which began in the latter
part of the nineteenth century. His lectures, books, and
articles in the legal magazines continuously and vigorously
8 CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL or NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930).
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opposed "the skeptical realism", "the give-it-up political
and legal philosophy" of the day, and championed that
philosophy which gives us "faith that we can do things and
so enables us to do things."
In November 1941 the Texas Law Review published a
devastating criticism of the positivist philosophy of law. It
was written by Moses J. Aronson, Editor of the Journal of
Social Philosophy and Juis prudence. A reprint had wide
circulation. Its significant title was The Swan-Song of
Legal Realism. It pointed out that the error of the self-
styled realists lay in their failure to accept thought, feel-
ings, and prevalent moral intuitions as part of experience.
In that regard -they are not realists. By rejecting funda-
mental insights of human nature, the natural and empirical
reality of ideals and standards, they create an illusory theory
of realism and a distorted conception of law. The processes
that express the synthetical function of our sensibility and
understanding, for that very reason, possess the validity of
laws of nature, if we mean by nature the totality of pheno-
mena.
This renaissance of Natural Law is revealed more recently
in such publications (illustrative but not exhaustive) as:
Magazine Articles
"Defense Against Leviathan", by Ben W. Palmer.'
"The Higher Law", by Harold R. McKinnon."
"Law and Philosophy", by Harold R. McKinnon.' 2
"Thomas Aquinas: Advocate of Natural Law and Limited
Sovereignty", by Wendell Phillips Dodge, Jr."3
9 Moses J. Aronson, Book Review, 20 TEX. L. REv. 118 (1941). Reprinted en-
titled The Swan-Song of Legal Realism.
10 Ben W. Palmer, Defense Against Leviathan, 32 A.B.AJ. 328 (1946).
11 McKinnon, op. at. supra note 2.
12 HROLD R. McKm moN, LAw "m Pnmosop y, Canadian Bar Review,
August-September, 1948 (reprint).
13 Wendell Phillips Dodge, Jr., Thomas Aquinas: Advocate of Natural Law
and Limited Sovereignty, 33 A.B.A.J. 1013 (October 1947).
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The articles on Dissents and Reversals in the U. S. Su-
preme Court appearing serially and currently in the Ameri-
can Bar Association Journal, and the accompanying edi-
torials. 4
Books
The American Philosophy of Law, by LeBuffe and
Hayes.1
5
The Natural Law, by Heinrich A. Rommen.'6
Liberty Against Government (Chapter II-Roman and
English Origins), by Edward S. Corwin."
And last, but not least, The Natural Law Institutes of the
University of Notre Dame. These Institutes and the ad-
dresses which they sponsored and published have had a
direct, stimulating, and constructive force which can hardly
be over-estimated.
This renewal of interest in Natural Law philosophy is now
being evidenced by citations and references in opinions of
the courts and juristic writings. Moreover, the efforts of the
United Nations and other agencies to promulgate a Bill of
Rights for the world have necessarily called forth appeals to
Natural Law philosophy and citations to juristic authorities
on Natural Law. The arguments in the Nuremberg trials
and the writings in defense of such proceedings also contain
references to Natural Law concepts and the juristic writings
that support a universal law.
Public Opinion
This revival of Natural Law is supported, moreover, by
a change in the climate of public opinion. The intense
materialism, scientism, and secularism which favored the
14 34 A.B.A.J. 554, 584 et seq. (1948).
15 FRANCIS P. LaBum and JAMEs V. HAYES, THE Amm=Ax PHIosoPny
OF LAW (1947).
16 RomMvN, op. cit. supra note 1.
17 EDWARD S. CoRwiN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOvERNMENT (1948).
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positivist philosophy has lost much of its assurance and arro-
gance since the last war. The bigotry of scientists has abated.
From observations in the laboratory and observatory the
universe had been growing increasingly mysterious. The
great physicists, like Jeans, Millikan and Eddington, recog-
nized a plan and order which did not exclude God. And the
great geologist, Dr. Alfred Church Lane, said shortly before
his death that "There are definite signs of God's plan in the
story of the earth as recorded in Geology .... Belief in God
is necessary to the progress of humanity." 18
When Dr. Einstein and the nuclear scientists themselves
began to cry out for the assertion of moral force to save the
world from the destructive agencies which science had re-
leased, leaders of thought in all fields of endeavor began
again to consider the source of man's moral power. The con-
fession of science, made at the time of its own greatest
achievement, that it was unable to save mankind from dis-
aster, revived a general concern for those ideals and beliefs
which had sustained man's faith and hope in times past.
This shift in public opinion from material to moral con-
siderations was evidenced also in education. Sir Richard
Livingston of the University of Oxford voiced the dissatis-
faction of many teachers when he said:
If you want a description of our age, here is one. The
civilization of means without ends; rich in means beyond
any other epoch, and almost beyond human needs; squan-
dering and misusing them, because it has no overruling ideal:
an ample body with a meagre soul.
The same feeling was voiced by a schoolman of this
country,1" who said that when we consider the crisis of
Western civilization, the possibilities of doom and disaster,
we cannot escape the feeling of Arnold that the world
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
18 Alfred Church Lane, My Faith, American Weekly, July 18,- 1948.
19 J. Fred Waring, The Alumni Record. Hudson, Ohio, Spring 1948.
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And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight
Where ignorant armies clash by night.
Such feelings by schoolmen could not be ignored. Educa-
tional surveys were instituted by various agencies, including
the President of the United States, and the aims and meth-
ods of teaching were re-examined. As a result we now hear
schoolmen declare that
Citizenship should be grounded in morality that flows
from religion, alert to the problems of the day and ready
to translate the ethical ideals of religion and democracy into
the realities of common life.
And we hear the dean of a state university law school pro-
claim "the democratic ideal, of which the Christian ethic of
sympathy is a religious expression."
In the field of general literature there has been a notice-
able trend away from the cynics and skeptics, who derided
and scoffed so popularly during the nineteen-twenties, toward
an increasing interest in mysticism and religion.20 Philosophy
and religion have regained respectability with the sophisti-
cates, and such works as Toynbee's Christian Philosophy oJ
History, Lecomte des Nouey's Human Destiny, and The
Road to Reason, and Liebman's Peace of Mind have become
best sellers.
Well-informed observers now testify to a general religious
awakening. It does not evidence itself in the form of the
old-time emotional revival, but appears in such movements
as the effort of merchants and manufacturers for Christian
Ethics in Business. As stated by C. A. Alington:
"The brotherhood of mankind" is now an article of faith
with many who reject the doctrine on which alone it securely
rests, the Christian ideal is accepted by many who deny its
creed, and what are called the Christian virtues are honored
by many who do not know them to be divine.21
20 Editorial, 34 A.B.A.J. 1119 (December 1948).
21 C. A. ARLINGTON, EUROPE, A PERSONAL AND POTirIcAL SURVEY (1948).
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Such activity can hardly be called religious in the true
sense of the word. But it does emphasize the moral signifi-
cance of life and give practical effect to the teaching of
religion. We realize this when we read in an influential
magazine the statement of a great teacher of economics that
"the basis of all 'sensible and feasible' economic policies is
moral rather than economic." 22 The best exemplification of
the practical application of a religious principle is found in
the doctrine of trusteeship which is now accepted and imple-
mented by the United Nations. Such concern for backward
and unfortunate people is but Christian charity applied to
international affairs. Charity and service are substituted for
imperialism and exploitation in international relations.
When we read the recent address of Mr. John Foster
Dulles, advisor on our bi-partisan foreign policy, we recog-
nize how nearly complete is our return to Natural Law.
Speaking on the possibilities of peace in the world, he said:
Two great principles are here involved. One is recognition
that there is a moral law and that it provides the only proper
sanction for man-made laws. The other principle is that
every human individual, as such, has dignity and worth that
no man-made law, no human power, can rightly desecrate....
Experience shows that when men organize a society in
accordance with these two basic beliefs, they can, within such
society, have peace with each other.28
Those two principles are the very pith and marrow of Nat-
ural Law.
Cycle of Natural Law
Thus it comes to pass that we witness the repetition again
of a cycle of history of Natural Law. Our generation has
seen what Dr. Rommen refers to as the Age of Individualism
and Rationalism, the Victory of Positivism, and now the
Reappearance of Natural Law. The very force of circum-
22 William A. Orton, Business and Ethics, Fortune, October 1948, p. 118.
28 John Foster Dulles, Which Way to World Peace ... Revolution or Re-
form, 3 FSEEom AND UNioN 8 (October 1948).
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stances, the tragic and fateful crisis that confronts us, com-
pel us, if we are to save humanity from violence and degra-
dation, to turn again to those principles of life which differ-
entiate men from the brutes. And as Macneile Dixon has
said, "If there is anything at all to distinguish man from
the brutes, it is his very singular faith in absolute and eternal
values."
Twenty-five hundred years ago Plato in his discussion of
the Laws introduced the doctrine of an ideal law which
resulted from the divine ordering of the cosmos. The Stoics
developed this idea into the doctrine of a universal law bind-
ing all rational beings into a world community. A cosmic
law should have cosmic validity, and as a result all mankind
should participate in a sphere of rights and duties that
transcend political boundaries.24 . To the Roman jurisconsults
this became the Law of Nature; i.e., the natural law of
man's moral nature, or Natural Moral Law. It was accepted
by the Church Fathers because it was consonant with Chris-
tian teaching. And through them it came to the Scholastic
philosophers of the Middle Ages, who welded it and imple-
mented it into constitutionalism, the theory of government
limited by law. That is the source and essence of Western
civilization and the very foundation of our own national
life.25
But the history of Natural Law has not been so direct and
smooth as that brief summary would indicate. It has suf-
fered the slings and arrows of misfortune. It has been mis-
used and abused. Like all doctrines that exercise restraint
and make for righteousness, it has been opposed by the per-
versity and evil tendency which is inherent in human nature.
Moreover it has been misrepresented by its over-zealous
adherents, and then scoffed at by skeptics and cynics. It has
24 Glenn R. Morrow, Plato and the Law of Nature, in ESSAYS xN PoLITm
THEORY 43 (1948).
25 ROBERT N. WILInq, THE JUDICIAL FUNcTION A INDUSTRIAL AND INTER-
NATIONAL DISPUTFS 28-33, 36 (1948); Manion, op. cit. supra note 7.
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been erroneously referred to as support for many false doc-
trines. Autocracy, vested interests, and reaction have been
especially prone to use it as a shield for imperialism. As a
result, many have opposed it who should have opposed only
its abuse.
But in spite of all opposition, and the numerous periods
of neglect and decline, Natural Law comes again into ascend-
ancy, because it is based on man's rational and social nature
and the moral order of life. As Emerson said:
The intuition of the moral sentiment is an insight of the
perfection of the laws of the soul. These laws execute them-
selves.2 5a
And so in our day, at the very time when the positivists
were proclaiming their exact science of law, and the modern
skeptics, like the sophists of old, were denying all possibility
of truth or justice, and the teachers of the intelligentsia were
proclaiming the death of Natural Law, an inexorable des-
tiny impels us to recognize it as the controlling factor in our
political life and our only hope for peace and security. Our
present experience brings back to us the conclusions of the
Stoic philosophers, the Roman jurisconsults, and the Church
Fathers. And so again the Natural Law returns to bury its
undertakers.
Before I conclude I should like to make two general
observations: (1) On constitutionalism, and (2) on the
practice of courts.
(1) Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism is the true implementation of Natural
Law, but it is threatened today by a too far swing toward
absolute or unrestrained democracy.
25G R. W. Emerson, Address, Divinity College, Miscrm=As 118 (Houghton,
Miflin & Co. 1882).
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Every normal man is subject to two conflicting impulses.
One prompts him to do as he pleases. The other prompts
him to do as he ought. One produces conduct that is willful,
capricious, arbitrary. The other produces conduct that is
reasonable, conscionable, just.
These conflicting impulses are present not only in every
individual but in every aggregation of individuals, including
nations and states. But the impulse to willful and arbitrary
conduct becomes stronger in those who exercise the power
of government. And, as already stated, the development of
extreme nationalism has tended to encourage and defend
the exercise of autocratic power, because the selfish tribal
instinct is stronger in men than their ethical judgment.
Human history is largely the story of conflict between arbi-
trary wills. And the history of political evolution is the story
of what von Jhering referred to as "The struggle for law";
that is, the effort to bring the arbitrary will under the con-
trol of reason and ethical judgment.
The culture or civilization of a man or a nation may be
measured by the degree to which arbitrary conduct has been
brought into rational control. "The wise man does what
ought to be done." The supreme accomplishment for con-
trol of government is constitutionalism. That is the great
achievement of Western civilization. It provides a govern-
ment not of men but of law, as distinguished from the abso-
lutism or despotism of Eastern civilization. Just as man has
found it necessary to have some fixed standards and prin-
ciples to control his arbitrary will, so the state has need of
some permanent principles, embodied in a constitution, which
set bounds to its arbitrary impulses as expressed in govern-
ment or the popular will at a particular moment.
The theory of government-subject-to-law was known to
Greek philosophers and Roman jurisconsults. Cicero dealt
with the idea in the Commonwealth. But it was never im-
plemented and made effective until the Middle Ages. Prior
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to that time there was no independent agency, no permanent
judiciary, to give effect to the law and restrain the arbitrary
power of governmental agents.
When men of the Church brought humanity up out of the
Dark Ages they became ministers of state and for hundreds
of years served as justiciars of the law.26 They were edu-
cated in the canon law of the Church and the civil law of
Rome. Their training therefore embraced both Christian
ethic and Natural Law. They examined the theory of the
state and the function of government in the light of the
teaching of a universal church. It was therefore natural for
them to hold that "the King is under no man but under God
and the law." That statement by Bracton, a priest and
judge, and quoted so effectively by Coke, Chief Justice, be-
came the cornerstone of constitutionalism.
The clerical judges were able to make their theories effec-
tive because of their independent and secure positions as
officers of the church and because of their consecration to
the service. When church and state became separated and
men of the church ceased to fill the judicial offices, the legal
profession had been so impressed by their standards that it
carried on the same traditions, just as the judges assumed
the priestly robes.
Thus we see that constitutionalism, the essence of Western
civilization, is dependent on two things:
1. The Natural Law theory of a higher law to which
government itself is subject, and
2. Independent courts, presided over by men of learning
who are consecrated to judicial service, with authority
to restrain abuse of power and arbitrary conduct.
But history teaches that it is the tendency of those who
oppose autocracy to arrogate to themselves the same arbi-
trary power when they become entrusted with the authority
26 WMKIIN, op. cit. supra note 25, at 12 et. seq.
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of government. Thus when Parliament won its struggle
against the Crown, it substituted a form of Parliamentary
absolutism to replace the absolute sovereignty of the king.
That was the cause of the revolt of the American colonies.
The founders of the American republic then based their gov-
ernment squarely on Natural Law and provided independent
courts for the protection of the inalienable rights which such
law recognizes.
But the people were given the power to choose their repre-
sentatives in government, and now we see a tendency to
enlarge that power into a form of popular absolutism, "the
dictatorship of the proletariat." The populace is impatient
of any legal restraint, and "is everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetu-
ous vortex." Flattered by demagogic references to "the sov-
ereign people", the voters are led to believe that they are
absolute sovereigns and that their arbitrary will must pre-
vail. But insofar as that takes place, constitutionalism dis-
integrates,2" and, as Madison said:
In a democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in
person the legislative function, and are continually exposed,
by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted
measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magis-
trates, tyranny may well be apprehended, on some favorable
emergency, to start up in the same quarter. (p. 309)
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self- appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. (p. 300) 28
It is apparent that our peace and security are endangered
today by an erroneous conception of sovereignty. It affects
both our domestic and foreign affairs. It is wrong because
the claim of absolute sovereignty contravenes the funda-
mental principles of Natural Law, i.e., the concept of a
higher law binding on all men and on government itself.
27 CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 181, 182.
28 THE FEDERAIST 300, 309 (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1889).
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As Professors McIlwain and Corwin have said, sovereignty
is historically a legal concept and implies legal limitation in
its very statement.29 It can not absolve men or nations
from the obligation to be guided by reason rather than
arbitrary will.
We can not maintain our free institutions at home or
extend them to the world by the assertion of absolute sov-
ereignty and arbitrary will. If freedom and human dignity
are to be preserved, we must preserve constitutionalism and
the Natural Law, upon which it was founded. As Mark
Ethridge says, "We are the trustees of both the ideological
and physical forces of Western civilization .. .
(2) Practice in Courts
Now in closing, if I may be indulged, I should like to
take advantage of this opportunity to give some personal
testimony in support of Natural Law. Ever since I became
interested in the philosophy of law I have been hearing the
opponents of Natural Law say:
It is impractical. It is idealistic. Its aims and principles
are very well for such reflective studies as Ethics and Moral
Philosophy, but they have no place in the actual administra-
tion of positive law.
As a result of ten years of experience as a trial judge in a
United States District Court I am convinced that such asser-
tions are not true. In fact they are mere nonsense. The
principles, standards, and precepts of Natural Law are con-
tinually employed by courts as the constitutions, statutes,
and precedents are interpreted and applied to the ever-vary-
ing circumstances of life. They are employed also in the
interpretation of wills, contracts, conduct and relationships
of life. They are part of man's nature and cannot be sepa-
rated from his life.
Courts continually use such tests as, What is reasonable?
What is true? What is fair? What is just? They do not
29 Cowv' , op. cit. supra note 17, at 188.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
stop to ask Pilate's question. They are not disturbed by the
intricate ratiocinations of the skeptics who think that all
such concepts are merely subjective and actually unattain-
able. Courts are not deterred by such conceits. They believe
that "Thinking is very far from knowing." They act upon
the admonition of Ruskin that if we "would only just look
at a thing instead of thinking what it must be like, or do a
thing instead of thinking it cannot be done, we should all
get on far better."
In order to illustrate the attitude of courts toward the
assertions of the skeptics, Dean Pound has developed the
analogy to the attitude of civil engineers toward the theories
of the higher mathematicians. In spite of the discrediting
effect of relativity upon the axioms of geometry, he points
out that surveyors continue to use those axioms to meet the
needs of men for highways, railroads, and bridges. So courts
rely on the thoughts and beliefs of common men and give
to words their generally accepted meaning, in confidence
that in such matters "the children of this world are in their
generation wiser than the children of light."
Not only do courts actually employ the ideals and stand-
ards of Natural Law; I shall say further, that a judge of
sentient mind and heart would hardly be able to endure the
responsibilities of office if he were denied the guiding influ-
ence and sustaining strength of Natural Law precepts and
philosophy.
And so the summation of all my study and experience
brings me to agreement with the statement of Professor
McIlwain that Cicero's words defining Natural Law are
"among the most memorable in political literature":
There is in fact a true law-namely, right reason-which
is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is un-
changeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons
men to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions
it restrains them from doing wrong. Its commands and pro-
hibitions always influence good men, but are without effect
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upon the bad. To invalidate this law by human legislation
is never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict
its operation, and to annul it wholly is impossible. Neither
the Senate nor the people can absolve us from our obligation
to obey this law, and it requires no Sextus Aelius to expound
and interpret it. It will not lay down one rule at Rome and
another at Athens, nor will it be one rule today and another
tomorrow. But there will be one law, eternal and unchange-
able, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will be,
as it were, one common master and ruler of men, namely God,
who is the author of this law, its interpreter, and its sponsor.
The man who -will not obey it will abandon his better self,
and, in denying the true nature of a man, will thereby suffer
the severest of penalties, though he has escaped all the other
consequences which men call punishment 8 0
Robert N. Wilkin.
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